

VZCZCXRO6478  
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO  
DE RUCNDT #0411 1121901  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 221901Z APR 09  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6378  
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHXX/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000411

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [UNSC](#) [EUN](#)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE'S MEETING WITH EU HIGH REP JAVIER SOLANA

Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana told Ambassador Rice on April 16 he thought Tehran would respond publicly to the April 8 P5 1 offer on engagement before entering into a discussion with the P5 1 about the possibility and modalities of a meeting. Solana said he was concerned about the situation in Pakistan, and that the EU had less leverage there than in neighboring Afghanistan. He sought U.S. views on Russia's proposal to hold a Quartet meeting on the margins of a proposed May 11 Ministerial-level Security Council meeting on the Middle East. Ambassador Rice thought that a Quartet meeting on the margins could provide an opportunity for Quartet envoy Tony Blair to give a long delayed briefing to the Council, which could also be a useful way to keep the discussion from devolving into an Israel-bashing session, which sometimes happens with Middle East meetings in the Council. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana told Ambassador Rice on April 16, that he believed Iran's first response to the recent P5 1 offer to engage with Tehran would be a public statement. Only afterward, Iran would engage with the P5 1 on the possibility of a meeting. Ambassador Rice asked Solana whether he had any concrete information on counterproposals from Ahmadinejad, and Solana responded that he had not heard anything precise. Solana also commented that P5 unity on North Korea, as shown in the Security Council's reaction to the North Korea rocket launch, had been an important signal to Teheran as well.

¶3. (C) Solana said he was concerned about stability in Pakistan. The EU was working well with Secretary Gates on Afghanistan, but had less capacity to act in Pakistan, though he agreed there were still economic and trade levers the EU could use with Islamabad. Ambassador Rice asked whether Solana saw the EU stepping up development assistance to Pakistan, and he responded, "we'll try."

¶4. (C) Solana sought U.S. views on Russia's proposal to hold a Quartet meeting on the margins of their proposed May 11 Ministerial-level Security Council meeting on the Middle East. Ambassador Rice said the U.S. had some reservations about a high-level Middle East meeting, since such meetings often serve as a platform for states like Syria and Libya to engage in Israel-bashing. She noted, however, that Russia seemed committed to holding the Ministerial in any case. Russia also wanted a Presidential Statement from the SC meeting that affirms the Council's commitment to a two-state solution. Solana and Ambassador Rice agreed that such a product could be helpful as pressure on the new Israeli government. Rice also thought that if a Quartet meeting were held, it could be an opportunity for the Quartet's envoy, Tony Blair, to brief the Council. A Blair briefing, which had been previously planned and postponed, could serve as a

useful focus for the meeting, and might help avoid the Israel-bashing scenario, she said.  
Rice